The EU’s constitutional design embodies German ordoliberal principles

Evidence

In the context of a late-developing, export-led economy that needs to force savings to catch up the British, this makes perfect sense: Erst Sparen—Dann Kaufen. But just as we saw in chapter 3, it rather spectacularly ignores the fact that for someone to be running an export surplus, someone else must be running a deficit. We cannot all run surpluses and save. Someone has to spend so that there is demand for these exports. Thus, a fallacy of composition of a different type rears its head again; and this is where the transfer of these austerity-based principles into the EU’s constitutional framework and in Germany’s policy response to the crisis, really shows up. If Germany’s focus on rules, obligations, a strong monetary authority, a weak parliament, and no spending to compensate for busts sounds familiar, it should. It’s the basic design of the EU. Germany’s response to the crisis, and the crisis itself, both spring from the same ordoliberal instruction sheet. — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 374

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly connects to the Mattei austerity literature and the broader EU-institutional critique; also ties to Blyth’s own chapter 3 fallacy-of-composition discussion. — connects to: Ordoliberalism justifies replacing democratic governance with rules and the ECB — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 377; German ordoliberalism was exported to Europe via the ECB constitution and Euro rules — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 375; WTO design deliberately scaled European constitutionalism into a global trade constitution — Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the…, 836 (+10 more)
  • DEFINE: Introduces ‘fallacy of composition’ of a second type as applied to surplus economies.

Broader Connections