The Enlightenment reduced the judge to an intellect insulated from character and values

Evidence

The judge sitting on the bench is nothing but an engine of subasmption, a judgment machine, a legal automaton or whatever other term may be found flthe new judicial ideal of an intellect that does not make choices armong values and thus is devoid of individuality. And since the intellect is incapable of formulating value judgments and since the judge who operates merely as an intellect cannot create legal norms, the judicial function must also be confined to the application of the law. Thus, these changed concepts of judge - and judgment illustrate for us a basic rule of legislative technique which we discussed before: the statute must be so framed that “its terms will make it easier for everyone to think decently, without ever requiring such decency for its enforcement. (Schiller)” But is it possible to confine the judicial function to the application of law? — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3465

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly connects to constitutional/legal-theory debates in Hart-Sacks material about the judge’s role and statutory interpretation. — connects to: Indulging equitable discretion too far would make every judge a legislator. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1303; Judicial opinions mask value judgments behind a surface of logical form. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1290; Judges’ personal attributes and even trivial bodily states can shape decisions

Broader Connections