The eight-day strike proved the FLN’s gravest tactical error of the war.

Evidence

Ramdane Abane crossed the ts by explaining that: “Even if we take risks, our struggle must become known. We could kill hundreds of colonialist soldiers without this ever being publicly announced.” The F.L.N. leaders felt that the combination of Yacef’s grip of terror on Algiers and the F.L.N.’s acquired influence among the trade unions as a whole — in the shape of the recently-formed U.G.T.A. (Union Général des Travailleurs Algériens) — made them strong enough to accept the risks involved, and over so prolonged a period as eight days. In fact, it was to turn out to be perhaps the F.L.N.’s gravest tactical error of the entire war. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 571

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s thread of how FLN strategic choices (Soummam externalization) interacted with French counterinsurgency. — connects to: The F.L.N.’s eight-day general strike was broken within forty-eight hours

Related

• The F.L.N.’s eight-day general strike was broken within forty-eight hours (similarity 0.90)
• The FLN’s general strike aimed to internationalize the Algerian conflict at the UN. (similarity 0.82)
• The FLN’s general strike aimed to sway the UN debate on Algeria. (similarity 0.81)
• The FLN weighed international opinion when choosing when to use terror (similarity 0.80)
• The F.L.N. strike aimed to externalize Algeria’s conflict to the United Nations. (similarity 0.80)
• The strike collapsed within forty-eight hours due to its excessive length. (similarity 0.79)