The conversation of justice must not have a victor

Evidence

CaveD also argues that this misses the fact that for Wittgenstein: skepticism is neither true nor false but a standing human threat to the human; that this absence of the victor helps articulate the fact that. in a democracy embodying good enough justice, the conversation over how good its justice is must take place and must also not have a victor, that this is not because agreement can or should always be reached but because disagreement. and separateness of position. is to be allowed its satisfactions. reached and expressed in particular ways. — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 345

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Cavell redefines skepticism as a standing threat rather than a doctrine, and links it to a democracy whose justice-conversation never concludes.
  • QUESTION: Worth chasing how this ‘no victor’ ideal squares with Schmitt’s friend/enemy decision that grounds the political in Mouffe’s framework.
  • XREF: connects to: Problems at justice frontiers need humility and self-awareness, not rationalist rigor — Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental…, 653; Negotiation is not the goal of morality for the framers — Anton Jäger and Daniel Zamora Vargas, Welfare for Markets: A Global History…, 33; The oppressed must reach conviction as Subjects, not receive it as objects — Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 171 (+2 more)

Broader Connections