The brain represents itself to itself, against Bergson’s denial of cerebral self-representation

Evidence

Indeed, one must suppose that the ‘‘proto-self’’ presents itself as ‘‘a coherent collection of neural patterns which represent the state of the organism, moment by moment, at multiple levels of the brain.’’ Thus there actually is, contrary to Bergson’s claim, a self-representation of the brain, an autorepresentation of cerebral structure that coincides with the auto-representation of the organism. … Everything happens as if the very connectivity of the connections—their structure of reference, in other words, their semiotic nature in general—represents itself, ‘‘maps’’ itself, and precisely this representational activity permits a blurring of the borders between brain and psyche. — Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, 194

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s plasticity/flexibility inquiry: this self-mapping autonomy is precisely what docile ‘flexibility’ would lack — a self that only receives form cannot map itself.