The 1994 devaluation was decided under French and IMF supervision in Dakar

Evidence

If we look at events over time, we can see that the 1994 devaluation was the culmination of decades of obstinacy on the part of Paris, encouraged by some African states, to keep the franc zone and its mechanisms in place, at all costs and in spite of reality. It’s clear that the CFA franc had long been overvalued for many countries of the zone. Economists had raised this issue several times, noting in particular how it penalised the export sectors, in particular the rural producers. — Fanny Pigeaud_ Ndongo Samba Sylla, Africa’s Last Colonial Currency, 217 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

The countries of the franc zone, which until then had seemed to be in good economic health, were severely affected. The zone’s heavyweights, Cameroon and the Ivory Coast, quickly entered a downward spiral. The response of the IMF, which had already provided loans to various countries without being repaid, was to demand a ‘real adjustment’, meaning a compression of internal demand through a reduction in public spending and imports, in order to bring the public accounts and trade balance back into equilibrium. It also suggested combining this real adjustment with a ‘monetary adjustment’: a devaluation of the CFA francs. From the point of view of the IMF, this wasn’t simply a way of recovering its capital, but also of creating the conditions for the imposition of its neoliberal dogma, which was now triumphant after the fall of the Soviet bloc in 1991. — Fanny Pigeaud_ Ndongo Samba Sylla, Africa’s Last Colonial Currency, 205 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: France’s guarantee is backed by pooled African reserves and French central bank seats; The 1994 devaluation tripled French financial advantages while shifting blame to the IMF.; France blocks AfDB support to pressure African states toward IMF programs (+4 more)

Broader Connections