Tempels framed Bantu Philosophy as a hypothesis, not a settled doctrine.

Evidence

In the second chapter of his book, while explaining the terminology used, Tempels insisted that his considerations should be regarded as a hypothesis and, at the same time, an attempt to develop systematic Bantu philosophy. — Frans Dokman, Beyond Bantu Philosophy_…, 224

While most would agree that the ghost of Tempels will indeed live forever in the history of African philosophy, it is nevertheless important to remind ourselves of how Tempels saw his own project, including the philosophicality of it. As Mudimbe (1988) reminds us, Tempels unpretentiously wrote at the beginning of his chapter on ontology: “the present study, after all, claims to be no more than an hypothesis, a first attempt at the systematic development of what Bantu philosophy is” (Tempels 1959, p. 28). … The debate about this “philosophy” that has since developed, and which is regularly repeated, appears to me unduly intellectual. Tempels’s work is certainly ambiguous. It is not, however, worth the extreme responses that it sometimes provokes. Surely one could reproach Tempels for confusing the vulgar meaning of philosophy with its technical definition, but by returning insistently and incessantly to this weakness, as though, philosophically, it constitutes a mortal sin, African philosophers obstruct more useful developments. — Frans Dokman, Beyond Bantu Philosophy_…, 369

Categorization

• QUESTION: How much does Tempels’s own hedging — calling his work a hypothesis — undercut his critics who accuse him of overgeneralizing from the Baluba people?
• XREF: Connects to ongoing debates in African philosophy about ethnophilosophy versus professional philosophy.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Frans Dokman, Beyond Bantu Philosophy_…, 224; Frans Dokman, Beyond Bantu Philosophy_…, 369