Technology standards are ecologically rational heuristics for non-optimizable settings.

Evidence

Such seemingly “primitive” regulatory approaches can, under circumstances common to environmental, health, and safety regulation, refl ect a greater degree of pragmatic wisdom than the elaborate technicality of costbenefi t analysis. In that sense, they can be described as “ecologically rational,” a term developed by cognitive psychologists to describe adaptively sensible heuristics for situations in which optimality cannot be obtained. … As explained below, the bestavailabletechnology requirement of section 316(b), like other seemingly “irrational” or “extremist” environmental statutes, embodies a signifi cant expressive wisdom in that it refuses to deny the irreplaceability of life or to embrace the utilitarian notion that an “optimal” amount of death ever can be identifi ed. — Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere, 529

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines ‘ecologically rational’ heuristics and ties BAT refusal to an expressive refusal to price life
• SHARE: The idea that banning optimization of human life is itself the wise norm would interest a regulatory-policy colleague in environmental economics
• XREF: connects to: Complex adaptive systems make the pretense of locating an optimal regulatory outcome deeply unwise. — Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental…, 264; Agencies should first ask whether cost-benefit analysis fits the statute at all — Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental…, 670; Systems are rational by reducing complexity without overburdening the individual — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 324

Broader Connections

• Systems are rational by reducing complexity without overburdening the individual #expands (0.82) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 324