Taylor defines freedom as critical self-reflection, not merely acting as one wants

Evidence

Charles Taylor, in criticizing the concept of atomism underly.. ing various strands of liberal theory, argues that the capacity for freedom re.. quires not only “a certain understanding of self, one in which the aspirations to autonomy and self..direction become conceivable,” but also requires that this self..understanding be sustained and defi “in conversation with others or through the common understanding which underlies the practices of our society” (Taylor 1 985a, 209). What is notable here is that Taylor does not dis.. card the notion that autonomy is central to the exercise of freedom, but rather emphasizes the social conditions that are necessary for its production and fl Furthermore, autonomy, for Charles Taylor, means not simply acting as one wants ( the Hobbesian requirement of negative freedom), but consists in achieving “a certain condition of self..clairvoyance and self.. understanding” in order to be able to prioritize and assess confl desires, fears, and aspirations within oneself, and to be able to sort out what is in one’s best interest from what is socially required ( 1 985c, 229). In other words, the exercise of freedom for Taylor turn not only on the ability to distance oneself from the social, but also, more importantly, on the capacity to turn one’s gaze critically to refl upon oneself in order to determine the horizon of possibil.. ities and strategies through which one acts upon the world. — Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety, 1035

Categorization

• DEFINE: Articulates Charles Taylor’s distinction between negative (Hobbesian) freedom and the communitarian ideal of self-clairvoyant, self-reflective freedom — a key contrast point for Mahmood’s account of embodied piety.
• XREF: connects to: Positive liberty means acting on one’s second-order desires through self-mastery. — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 8