Tax compliance depends on a distinct morale eroded by perceived unfairness

Evidence

In his inaugural lecture at Berlin University in January 1932, Schmölders generalized these findings further, arguing that there was a specific tax morale that differed from conceptions of morality in other fields. This tax morale could easily be undermined if people felt overburdened or treated unfairly or even if the state spent tax revenues unwisely. — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 319

Categorization

• DEFINE: Introduces the concept of a distinct ‘tax morale’ separate from general morality — a useful definitional anchor for the reader’s larger map of postwar ordoliberal/neoliberal fiscal thought.
• XREF: connects to: Perceived unequal tax treatment made once-compliant Moriscos stop paying protection money; Perceived police unfairness reduces public willingness to cooperate; Drone technology produces a combined morale-buffering effect on operators (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Perceived police unfairness reduces public willingness to cooperate #corroborates (0.80)
• Perceived unequal tax treatment made once-compliant Moriscos stop paying protection money #exemplifies (0.78)
• Drone technology produces a combined morale-buffering effect on operators #corroborates (0.72)
• Redemption scams exploit tax code opacity and belief that others beat the system #qualifies (0.72) — Anna Merlan, Republic of Lies, 645