Swedish austerity in the 1920s produced the greatest slump in the nation’s history

Evidence

Persisting with austerity, Sweden returned to the gold standard in 1924, a year ahead of the British, despite the further deflationary effect it had on the economy. GDP fell by approximately one-third and unemployment rose by one-third as a result. Being back on gold combined with an almost continuous contractionary fiscal stance in the latter half of the 1920s to produce unemployment of the order of 12 percent by the late 1920s, notwithstanding an export boom. Despite (or perhaps because of) this huge deflation, industrial unrest spiked, with five million working days lost in 1928 alone. When the combined forces of American capital flight, the central European liquidity crunch, and the British leaving the gold standard hit the Swedish economy in 1931, unemployment rose to nearly 25 percent in 1932. Austerity had helped Sweden produce an export surplus in the 1920s at the price of 12 percent unemployment. By the 1930s continuing austerity had produced the greatest slump in Swedish history and doubled that unemployment rate. — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 520

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects to the broader austerity critique literature (Mattei) as a concrete interwar case study of deflationary fiscal policy producing unemployment rather than recovery. — connects to: The 1937 recession was a deliberate natural experiment in austerity that failed — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 510; In the 1920s tiny owner classes imposed austerity on overwhelming majorities — Clara E. Mattei, The Capital Order: How Economists…, 1472; High Bank rates triggered a deflationary spiral in 1920s Britain — Clara E. Mattei, The Capital Order: How Economists…, 1697 (+5 more)
  • SEED: Sweden’s interwar experience — austerity’s export surplus at the price of 12 percent unemployment — offers a sharp empirical counterpoint to modern austerity defenses.

Broader Connections