Stereotypes are both causes and consequences of prejudice, not either-or.

Evidence

The apparent inconsistencies in Allport’s thinking, however, stem in part from the complexity of the phenomenon. A prominent example concerns the role of stereotyping in prejudice. Early on in The Nature of Prejudice, in chapter 2, he implicated stereotypic thinking as a foundation for prejudice. He observed, “The category saturates all that it contains with the same ideational and emotional flavor” (1954/1979, p. 21). Later, in chapter 12, he wrote that stereotypes are “primarily rationalizers. They adapt to the prevailing temper of prejudice or the needs of the situation. While it does no harm (and may do some good) to combat them … it must not be thought that this attack alone will eradicate the roots of prejudice” (p. 204). Allport explicitly addressed the apparent contradiction in these statements, embracing stereotypes as both causes and consequences of prejudice: “The stereotype acts as both a justificatory device for categorical acceptance or rejection of a group, and as a screening or selective device to maintain simplicity in perception and thinking” (p. 192). Fifty years later, after thousands of studies on stereotyping, the extent to which stereotypes are cause or consequence of prejudice remains a subject of lively debate. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 101 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

One of the most notable aspects of Allport’s book is his understanding of the role that categorization plays in maintaining the negative consequences of prejudice (see Fiske, ch. 3 this volume). He recognized the power of categories to structure intergroup relations and he anticipated decades of research showing that cognitive processes associated with categorization facilitate the harm done by prejudices. But importantly, he maintained that prejudice is the fundamental problem of intergroup relations, not categorization. Allport argued that categories and their attendant stereotypes operate in the service of prejudice, noting that the purpose of stereotypes “is to justify (rationalize) our conduct in relation to that category” (1954/ 1979, p. 191). — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 834 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Stereotypes function simultaneously as both causes and consequences of prejudice — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 101; Categorization itself is not the problem; prejudice drives stereotypes, not vice versa. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 834; Changing stereotypes without changing underlying hostility fails because stereotypes follow from prejudice. (+8 more)

Broader Connections

• Stereotypes function simultaneously as both causes and consequences of prejudice #corroborates (1.00) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 101
• Categorization itself is not the problem; prejudice drives stereotypes, not vice versa. #complicates (0.85) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 834
• Changing negative stereotypes without changing hostility will fail because stereotypes are consequences, not causes #complicates (0.85)
• Prejudice motivates exaggerated group differences, not the reverse. #complicates (0.80) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 892