Status signaling is only necessary under information asymmetry with strangers.

Evidence

We don’t have to signal to everyone—only in times of information asymmetry. Our friends, family, and neighbors know us well and made conclusions about our status level long ago. Most public individuals have a reputation based on past actions and interactions. (Fame maximizes these reputations to extreme degrees, with the mass media educating millions on the high status of celebrities.) But in modernity—the epoch that the anthropologist Charles Lindholm defines as “the condition of living among strangers”—most of us need to constantly claim status upon interaction with unknown parties. And in a world of achieved status, we may also need to signal recent increases in status to our acquaintances. — W. David Marx, Status and Culture, 197

Categorization

  • XREF: Deep resonance with Lofland’s ‘World of Strangers’ argument that urban modernity forces categorical reading of strangers rather than personal knowledge; also Lindholm’s definition of modernity as living among strangers. — connects to: Direct status claims are self-defeating because eager signaling signals low status — W. David Marx, Status and Culture: How Our Desire for
, 198; Those low in status need stronger signals to compensate for low-status cues — W. David Marx, Status and Culture: How Our Desire for
, 202; Status symbols create a tradeoff between exclusivity and legibility to outsiders — W. David Marx, Status and Culture: How Our Desire for
, 224 (+3 more)
  • DEFINE: Clarifies why signaling matters precisely and only when reputational knowledge is absent, giving a boundary condition to the whole signaling model.

Broader Connections