States tolerate or promote collusion when they capture a share of proceeds

Evidence

Legitimate scares frequently tolerate or even promote collusion in exchange for a share of the proceeds. There is no shortage of examples. European car manufacturers lobby to keep Japanese competitors at bay by means of tariffs and regulations. Italian airlines—a fiefdom of the Christian Democrats—maintain scandalously high prices while fighting off competitors by controlling space at airports and flying routes; the fare for the same distance in the deregulated U.S. market is less than half what Italian travelers pay. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 512

Categorization

• XREF: Direct parallel to the state/mafia competition for protection mandates — states restrict competition too, and both demand payment. Extends the reader’s private-enforcement market model into state collusion. — connects to: Regulators can extract concessions from exchanges by leveraging market-launch priorities. — Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial…, 772; Price fixing among small-market-share firms should not be per se illegal — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 1145; State governments collude with polluters to secure continued foreign investment — Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism…, 979 (+1 more)