State tolerance suppresses mafia violence while mixed state responses provoke it.

Evidence

Paradoxically, had there been a consistently acquiescent attitude on the part of the state, had the state invariably chosen to bargain with the mafia, de facto acknowledging its semilegal status—enjoyed, for instance, by the yakuza in Japan—the mafia would not have been so violent. But the fact is that the Italian state breeds both rats and heroes. There is a split within the state itself whereby to the connivance of many there corresponds the struggle of a few loyal servants. Since the late 1970s the Italian state has launched a very forceful antimafia campaign. If so many in its ranks have lost their lives, this is due also to the fact that not every politician and state official was supporting them. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 29

Categorization

• XREF: Extends Gambetta’s private-protection market model: the state’s mixed connivance/heroism is what destabilizes equilibrium, contrasting with the yakuza case in Japan. Connects to Milgrom’s insight about institutions emerging where governance is inconsistent. — connects to: Regime narrowing of tolerated nonviolent performances channels claimants toward violence and invites state force — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 744
• QUESTION: Does the split-state account explain why some judges (Falcone, Borsellino) rather than others became assassination targets? The passage implies a targeted mechanism but leaves it under-specified.