Splitting inner libidinal nature from outer nature makes an instrumental stance untenable.

Evidence

In his inaugural lecture in Frankfurt, Habermas spoke of the seductive aspect of nature that was present in each individual in the form of libido and which demanded a utopian fulfilment. Individual demands of this type were taken up by the social system and incorporated into the social definition of the good life. … But were inner and outer nature not two aspects of one and the same nature? Was it possible in the long term for the intellect to have a divided relationship to them? Could libido be included in the definition of the good life without a libidinous relationship to external nature also being incorporated in the definition? Could a purely instrumental relationship to external nature be sustained without having an effect on behaviour towards everything that was imbued with nature, including mankind? Was the concept of language competence as forming a dividing line between instrumental and communicative behaviour not already a dubious one in relation to the animal world? — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 609

Categorization

• QUESTION: The reviewer’s counter-questions ask whether Habermas’s inner/outer nature divide can be consistently maintained — worth chasing against Habermas’s later replies.
• DEEPTHINKING: Presses the coherence of the whole Habermasian settlement: can an instrumental relation to outer nature really be severed from inner nature and from language competence?