Southern courts openly declared slaves outside the protection of common law

Evidence

A South Carolina judge, in 1847, put the case bluntly. A slave, he said, “can invoke neither magna carta nor common law… . In the very nature of things, he is subject to despotism. Law as to him is only a compact between his rulers.” — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 1352

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the legal-personhood boundary: law as ‘a compact between rulers’ toward slaves shows how legal standing was denied to a class — useful shared course vocabulary on legal personhood.
• XREF: connects to: Southern law did not protect enslaved families from forced separation by sale — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 1343; Southern delegates argued enslaved people were property, not taxable free persons. — Edward J. Larson, Declaring Independence, 293; State courts adjudicated liability disputes over leased slave property like any other asset — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 237

Broader Connections

• Southern law did not protect enslaved families from forced separation by sale #expands (0.85) — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 1343
• Southern delegates argued enslaved people were property, not taxable free persons. #expands (0.75) — Edward J. Larson, Declaring Independence, 293
• State courts adjudicated liability disputes over leased slave property like any other asset #corroborates (0.75) — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law, 237