Some disputes resist rational adjudication because they lack general criteria

Evidence

The point is crucial in the whole theory of social ordering. If the sug.ested line of thought is right, then there are no disputes of any kind which cannot be effectually settled by establishing an impartial and sufficiently prestigeful tribunal to hear them, giving both sides or all sides of the dispute an opportunity to present their evidence and argument, and then having the tribunal make its decision. Compare the opposite conclusion of Professor Fuller, at p. 421 et seq., above, that “it would seem that adjudication is meaningless unless the decision is reached by some rational process,” and that, “If a decision is to be rational it must be based upon some rule, principle, or standard.” — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3305

Categorization

• XREF: States the contested line between the Hart-Sacks instrumentalist view and Fuller’s rationality requirement that organizes the casebook. — connects to: Only some dispute types are apt for settlement by adjudication — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3262; Adjudication requires impersonal criteria of decision applicable across similar cases — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3298; Polycentric problems with interdependent judgments resist adjudication — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3342 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Some contested explanations cannot be settled by substantive argument #corroborates (0.95) — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 381
• Moral disputes over ideal states cannot be settled by reason alone. #corroborates (0.92) — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 552
• Llull proposed settling interreligious disputes through rational proof rather than scriptural authority #exemplifies (0.80)