Sociology should not let normative outrage about brutal power distort its concepts.

Evidence

In a much acclaimed, extensive critique of the work of Parsons, and of his power theory in particular, Alvin Gouldner expresses his surprise that Parsons, in his treatment of power as a symbolically generalized medium, identifies it so closely with legitimate power, with ‘establishment power’, and that he takes this as normal for society. Pointing to the brutality and selfishness of power-holders, he dismisses this view, across the board as well as in its individual formulations, as unrealistic, as intellectually absurd, as utopian, as misleading. This astonishment on the part of a sociologist is itself astonishing to sociologists, even more so because it is formulated in the framework of a sociology of sociology. Of course, it is indisputable that sociology can and should concern itself with the phenomena of the brutal and selfish exercises of power. Such an interest, however, should not grow into a prejudiced view concerning social reality, built into concepts and theories. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 611

Categorization

• XREF: Gouldner’s critique of Parsons is the classic objection the reader will need to preempt if applying systems theory to Darlington’s ‘legitimate’ but morally hollow power — the theory already has a reply in Luhmann’s self-reference here.
• QUESTION: Worth chasing: whether Luhmann’s dismissal of ‘prejudiced views’ itself smuggles in a normativity — does the code-guided analysis still carry an implicit legitimating stance?