Skepticism does not produce more robust moral agency than theism does.

Evidence

Yet, the implications of adopting a divine-command theory extend even beyond the political, for in the very act of making it a starting point for reflection on the world there lies the profound assumption that this world is saturated with goodness and that everything in it is made in accordance with an ethical plan. By contrast, an epistemology that leads to skepticism is bound to land the skeptic in what Bardsley has called (as we saw earlier) a “hopeless conundrum,” without this guaranteeing a more robust moral agency than the theist would possess. If anything, a whole line of philosophical-historical analysis shows the opposite, a line that ranges from Foucault’s discursive formations to the problem of moral neutrality and Arendt’s banality of evil and moral agency’s resignation to bureaucratic and other forms of domination. — Wael Hallaq, Restating Orientalism, 516 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Theistic moral grounding can yield more robust moral agency than secular skepticism. — Wael Hallaq, Restating Orientalism: A Critique of…, 516; Skepticism belongs to belief, so faith remains fertile in a postmodern world. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 394

Broader Connections