Sheltering wrongdoers from consequences prevents reform and preserves harmful structures

Evidence

A uniquely striking feature of the catastrophe is that the finance industry, through its reckless practices, caused a global financial disaster without anyone being held responsible for it. It was widely assumed that the massive financial collapse would force a wave of reform. Instead, it left a catastrophe with no guilty parties. Wrongdoers do not change when they are sheltered from the consequences of their harmful conduct. As a result, the basic structure of the industry remains essentially unchanged. — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 1564

Categorization

• XREF: Connects directly to vault claims about institutions rationalizing harm — Cooper’s argument that social-conservatism policies go unchallenged because beneficiaries evade accountability. — connects to: State injustice becomes manageable by delaying accountability until wrongdoers die — Mark Fisher (edited by Darren Ambrose), K-Punk: The Collected and Unpublished…, 1755; Uncompromising reformers harm the poor by preventing partial reforms — Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the…, 572
• QUESTION: Bandura says wrongdoers don’t change when sheltered — but does the mechanism require absence of accountability specifically, or absence of internal disengagement too? Worth chasing the theoretical link.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 1564