Self-presence and self-possession are not origins but products of absence and deferral

Evidence

But Derrida also argues that the problem with classical concepts of intentionality is that they seek to actualize and totalize it into self-presence and self-possession. It is this telos of the concept of intentionality that he is calling into question. In this context, it is not so much the ever-necessary possibility of the writer/reader’s absence to the context, but the claim of the writer-reader’s presence to himself in certain privileged contexts, that Derrida deconstructs, arriving back at the position that the necessary possibility of the absence of sender and receiver is the positive condition of possibility of “communication.” — Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean, The Spivak Reader, 679

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Selfness arises when the possible I am is reflected as absent-presence; Self-presence requires an internal separation that is itself nothing; Authenticity as full self-identity is impossible because iterability makes self-presence unattainable in principle — Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean, The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of…, 767 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Selfness arises when the possible I am is reflected as absent-presence #corroborates (0.85)
• Self-presence requires an internal separation that is itself nothing #expands (0.85)
• Authenticity as full self-identity is impossible because iterability makes self-presence unattainable in principle #corroborates (0.80) — Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean, The Spivak Reader, 767
• Divine self-presence is opened up by an internal distance rather than merely broken #qualifies (0.80) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 858