Self-interest-based relationships become psychologically experienced as moral commitments

Evidence

In a somewhat analogous sense, the ordinary supposition that we act from norms may supervene psychologically on motivation by interests. For example, I develop a collection of friendships, each of which is rewarding to me in its own ways. I value the friendships for what they do for me, and I spend more time on and develop those that do most for me. I also begin to think of them as normatively valuable. I would strongly assert that they are good—and, of course, they are good, in the sense that they are good for me, which is to say that they benefit me in various ways. Once they are in place, however, I think of them as morally grounded. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 417

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: The claim that moral valuations are post-hoc psychological supervenience on interests — and that people genuinely cannot perceive the substitution — is a dense, paradigm-level insight about the origins of normative commitment.
• XREF: connects to: Moral judgment of adultery reflects interest, not nature; Helping other species is not selfless because witnesses themselves receive relationship in exchange — Robin Wall Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom,…, 1314