Secret ballot strips voters of power to prove their votes
Evidence
But where trust and good faith do not exist and cannot be made to by our acting as though they did, we may wish to solicit advice from the underworld, or from ancient despotisms, on how to make agreements work when trust and good faith are lacking and there is no legal recourse for breach of contract. The ancients exchanged hostages, drank wine from the same glass to demonstrate the absence of poison, met in public places to inhibit the massacre of one by the other, and even deliberately exchanged spies to facilitate transmittal of authentic information. It seems likely that a well-developed theory of strategy could throw light on the efficacy of some of those old devices, suggest the circumstances to which they apply, and discover modern equivalents that, though offensive to our taste, may be desperately needed in the regulation of conflict. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 52
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Italian preference votes could be audited via secret number sequences to verify vote sales; Secret ballots protect voters by destroying evidence of their vote — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 52; Mandatory secrecy of the ballot protects voters from intimidation by removing proof. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 343
Related
- Secret ballots protect voters by destroying evidence of their vote (similarity 0.91)
- Italian preference votes could be audited via secret number sequences to verify vote sales (similarity 0.91)
- Mandatory secrecy of the ballot protects voters from intimidation by removing proof. (similarity 0.88)
Broader Connections
- Mandatory secrecy of the ballot protects voters from intimidation by removing proof.
#corroborates(0.95) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 343