Seasonal weather constraints forced 1776 campaigns into a narrow summer window.

Evidence

British officers viewed these matters much as their American counterparts did. In a letter to his superiors in London, for example, General Howe expressed his fear that a Fabian defensive strategy by the “rebels” could “spin out the campaign,” while drawing them into a decisive action could swiftly “terminate this expensive war.” A quick end required timely action because large European armies such as the one Howe led typically fought only in summer and fall, after the end of spring rains made roads passable for marching soldiers and heavy baggage but before winter snows closed them again. By waiting to start his ground campaign until his full force reached New York in mid-August, Howe cut the time for optimal military operations in 1776 by six weeks even as his eager troops spoke of finishing off the rebels in a “season.” With naval dominance, the maze of rivers and islands around New York City gave Howe a chance to trap Washington’s army there and end the rebellion before winter extended it into 1777. Through an excess of caution, he reduced his time to deal a fatal blow. — Edward J. Larson, Declaring Independence, 238

Categorization

• QUESTION: Worth chasing: how did the short campaigning season structure the strategic logic of both commanders in this founding moment?
• XREF: connects to: Howe’s caution narrowed his own window for decisive victory in 1776 — Edward J. Larson, Declaring Independence, 238

Broader Connections

• Howe’s caution narrowed his own window for decisive victory in 1776 #complicates (0.85) — Edward J. Larson, Declaring Independence, 238