Scientific knowledge operates as a pragmatic game governed by contract

Evidence

The argumentation required for a scientific statement to be accepted is thus subordinated to a “first” acceptance (which is in fact constantly renewed by virtue of the principle of recursion) of the rules defining the allowable means of argumentation. Two noteworthy properties of scientific knowledge result from this: the flexibility of its means, that is, the plurality of its languages; and its character as a pragmatic game—the acceptability of the “moves” (new propositions) made in it depends on a contract drawn between the partners. Another result is that there are two different kinds of “progress” in knowledge: one corresponds to a new move (a new argument) within the established rules; the other, to the invention of new rules, in other words, a change to a new game. — Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 325

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Lays out the two kinds of knowledge-progress: new moves within rules versus invention of new rules (paralogy vs. innovation).
  • XREF: The ‘new move vs. new rules’ distinction maps cleanly onto the Kuhn normal-science vs. paradigm-shift distinction—worth connecting explicitly. — connects to: Narrative and scientific knowledge are incommensurable language games with no common criterion — Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on
, 232; Contracts function as a form of norm-making between principals and agents — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 44; Science justifies methods by success while ignoring domains where intersubjective certainty fails (+8 more)

Broader Connections