Schmitt’s homogeneity requirement targets liberal interest-group pluralism, which he rightly faults

Evidence

By asserting the need for homogeneity in a democracy, Schmitt is teUing us something about the kind of bond that is needed if a democratic political community is to exist. In other words, he is analysing the nature of the ‘friendship’ which defines the ‘us’ in a democracy. This, for him, is, of course, a way of taking issue with liberalism for not recognizing the need for such a form of commonality, and for advocating pluralism. If we take his target to be the liberal model of interest-group pluralism which postulates that agreement on mere procedures can assure the cohesion of a liberal society, he is no doubt right. Such a vision of a pluralist society is certainly inadequate. — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 230

Categorization

• XREF: Directly relevant to the reader’s test of agonistic pluralism: Schmitt’s critique of procedure-based unity is the affirmative ground the theory builds on. — connects to: Schmitt’s homogeneity thesis illuminates an aspect of democratic politics liberalism erases — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 166; Deliberative democracy eliminates pluralism to achieve consensus, leaving it unable to answer Schmitt — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 225; Schmitt holds homogeneity a condition of possibility for any actual democracy — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 166 (+2 more)
• QUESTION: Worth chasing: if Schmitt is right against liberal proceduralism, what non-homogeneous bond could plausibly sustain a democratic ‘us’?

Broader Connections

• Kirchheimer rejected Schmitt’s claim that democracy requires homogeneity #complicates (0.90) — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 961
• Later ordoliberals reframed their anti-pluralism as opposing only wrong kinds of group participation #complicates (0.75) — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 576