Scandinavian 1990s bailouts removed bankers while bailing out banks

Evidence

In 1992 Scandinavian banks failed and states stepped in to save them. But they did not save the bankers. Instead, they kicked them out, nationalised the banks, appointed new directors and, years later, sold them to new owners. — Yanis Varoufakis, Technofeudalism, 929

Categorization

• XREF: A concrete counterexample that sharpens the ‘bankruptocracy’ thesis — the state can save banks without saving bankers, so the post-2008 choice was political, not structural. — connects to: Letting banks fail reversed Iceland’s two-decade inequality surge — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 647; European banks are too big for any single government to bail out — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 37; The Day of Reckoning narrative collapsed when bankers were bailed out and prospered — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 468 (+1 more)
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Yanis Varoufakis, Technofeudalism: What Killed Capitalism, 929

Broader Connections

• Letting banks fail produced better outcomes than bailouts in 2008 #contradicts (0.75) — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 622