Sartre rejects the instrumental body, insisting the lived body is action

Evidence

In the chapter on the body, Sartre explains the diff erence between the bodyfor-me and the body-for-others. While I can exist as my body, I cannot be said to fully exist as my body-for-others. While an examination of the Other and her body may lead us to think that the body is merely an instrument for consciousness, Sartre insists that my body is action. When I use my hand to lift a glass, the hand is part of a complex of relations between my project and the resistance of objects, that is, the glass and its heaviness. My body is action, and I live it as such. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 97

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Sartre’s own writings drift from lived body toward instrumental body — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 99; For Sartre the body is a willed instrument that consciousness commands — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 119; Sartre rejects the Cartesian split of free will from determined passions — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1078 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• For Sartre the body is a willed instrument that consciousness commands #contradicts (0.95) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 119
• Sartre’s own writings drift from lived body toward instrumental body #contradicts (0.90) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 99
• Sartre rejects the Cartesian split of free will from determined passions #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1078
• Sartre rejected Cartesian dualism by treating material givens as meaning-sedimented facticities #corroborates (0.80) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 63
• Sartre divides being into free for-itself consciousness and inert in-itself matter #complicates (0.75) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 496