Sartre offers no positive account of resources one provides to another’s freedom

Evidence

Th ough Sartre also views human beings as responsible for improving the lives of others as well as ourselves, I am arguing that he doesn’t give us a positive account of the kinds of resources we can actually provide to the Other to help her will her freedom, nor does he acknowledge that the Other can deprive us of these resources altogether through their domination. Instead, the Other always seems to pose a threat to my freedom, and I recover my freedom (which, as we have seen, the Other can never really rob me of in the fi rst place) by reestablishing the absolute dichotomy between my own subjective experience of the world and that of the Other. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 656

Categorization

• QUESTION: Worth verifying against Sartre’s postwar political writings — did his ‘we-subject’ or commitment ethics ever supply this positive account that the ethics lectures lack?
• XREF: connects to: Sartre calls being-for-others characteristics unrealizables — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1235; Sartre grounds all value in an unjustified, self-legitimizing freedom — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 185; Sartre offers no defense of why existential honesty beats self-deception — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 188