Sartre’s look-theory precludes a totalized we-object

Evidence

For-myself I am not a professor or a waiter in a café, nor am I handsome or ugly, Jew or Aryan, spiritual, vulgar, or distinguished. We shall call these characteristics unrealizables. We must be careful not to confuse them with the imaginary. We have to do with perfectly real existences; but those for which these characteristics are really given are not these characteristics, and I who am them can not realize them. If I am told that I am vulgar, for example, I have often grasped by intuition as regards others the nature of vulgarity; thus I can apply the word “vulgar” to my person. But I can not join the meaning of this word to my person. There is here exactly the indication of a connection to be effected but one which could be made only by an interiorization and a subjectivizing of the vulgarity or by the objectivizing of the person—two operations which involve the immediate collapse of the reality in question. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1235 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The Other-as-object reinforces the world’s objectivity while the Other-as-look dissolves it; Sartre calls being-for-others characteristics unrealizables — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1235

Broader Connections

• The Other-as-object reinforces the world’s objectivity while the Other-as-look dissolves it #expands (0.90)
• Sartre calls being-for-others characteristics unrealizables #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1235