Sartre’s invented-value ethics lacks the general evaluative power of Kantian universalization

Evidence

Even if we fi nd this kind of reply to the skeptic inadequate, we still do well to ask whether this thin sketch of authenticity provides anything like the grounds of an adequate ethics. Do either the logical or existential contradictions help us to evaluate situations any more clearly than when a maxim fails to be willed as a universal law, in the Kantian sense- a principle already imputed as too general? To begin an answer to this question, notice that if every free action results in an invented value (where the inventiveness, in part, regards the navigation of an irreducibly unique situation), then every free action, qua exercise of freedom, entails that freedom itself is valuable. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 188

Categorization

• QUESTION: Where does this passage trail—the ‘every free action, qua exercise of freedom,’ cuts off mid-thought in the source, suggesting the analysis continues into the next paragraph unavailable here.
• XREF: connects to: Sartre’s least-favoured principle delegitimizes elite rationalizations of inequality — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 858; Beauvoir’s ethics derive moral obligations from interdependent transcendence — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 578; Beauvoir rejected Kantian ethics for presupposing a closed voluntarist circularity — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 428 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• Beauvoir rejected Kantian ethics for presupposing a closed voluntarist circularity #corroborates (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 428
• Beauvoir rejected Kantian respect as an inadequate moral guide #corroborates (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 479
• Beauvoir’s ethics derive moral obligations from interdependent transcendence #complicates (0.82) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 578
• Beauvoir’s ethical freedom departs from Sartre’s ontological freedom to make morality possible #corroborates (0.80) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 610
• Beauvoir rejects both Kantian duty and Marxist necessity as decision grounds #corroborates (0.80) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 480