Royal authority repeatedly overruled local oligarchies to protect converted officials

Evidence

Again royal intervention was forthcoming to protect el Fisteli/ Fernando de Morales. The city tried to tempt him with the line that he could still collect his salary (500 maraved´ıs a month), but he was to have no share in fines imposed by the officials (an important part of the income of the fiel ejecutor). Yet again royal intervention on behalf of el Fisteli meant that he won the day; indeed, it took a threat in 1511 to fine the city authorities 1,000 golden doblas (an absolutely immense sum) before they would comply. — L. P. Harvey, Muslims in Spain, 1500 to 1614, 228

Categorization

• XREF: Mirrors the Milgrom law-merchant material on crown guarantees substituting for local/community enforcement; crown protection here stands in for reputation mechanisms in a coercive context.