Revolutionary terror designed to discredit the state often backfires into sympathy for the state.

Evidence

Sergent reckoned that “our only chance to swing in our favour a significant section of metropolitan opinion is to create a situation obliging the regime to react violently and discredit itself”. It was the traditional formula of the modern revolutionary terrorist, whether Tupamaros or Baader-Meinhof, and — as so often happens — it was to produce quite the opposite results from those desired by Sergent. Over the six months, culminating in February, that the main O.A.S. offensive in France lasted, it was to do as much as anything else to tilt French sympathies towards de Gaulle’s acceptance of a precipitate withdrawal from Algeria. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1523

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects to the standard provocation-vs-overreaction mechanism of terrorism literature and to my notes on how violence tilts public sympathy. — connects to: Terrorism aims to provoke state repression that radicalizes the population.; Provoking state repression is the core mechanism of modern revolutionary terrorism — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 368; States manufacture paranoia so the public welcomes the very power that created the anxiety (+5 more)
  • QUESTION: Why did the same OAS tactics that terrorized Algeria fail to swing metropolitan Paris opinion — was it the victims being French children?

Broader Connections