Reviewing my eight items, we can see that Cardozo had a solid pragmatic grasp of the weakness of formalism (point 3) and a good pragmatic theory of adjudication (point 6), but free speech was not an issue about which he was much concerned (point 1); the critique of intention and causation (point 2) was less developed than it is today and certainly less salient in Cardozo’s thinking; he was uninterested in interpretation and unrealistic about the legislative process (point 3); and he was innocent of the economic approach to law as a self-conscious methodology (point 6)-it did not exist in 1921, or indeed until half a century later-but like most good common law judges he had intuitions of it.

Evidence

Reviewing my eight items, we can see that Cardozo had a solid pragmatic grasp of the weakness of formalism (point 3) and a good pragmatic theory of adjudication (point 6), but free speech was not an issue about which he was much concerned (point 1); the critique of intention and causation (point 2) was less developed than it is today and certainly less salient in Cardozo’s thinking; he was uninterested in interpretation and unrealistic about the legislative process (point 3); and he was innocent of the economic approach to law as a self-conscious methodology (point 6)-it did not exist in 1921, or indeed until half a century later-but like most good common law judges he had intuitions of it. — Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 138 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim
  • XREF: connects to: Pragmatic jurisprudence has advanced beyond Cardozo mainly in economics and free speech — Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 138

Broader Connections