Republican-appointed D.C. Circuit judges favor laxer regulation and Democratic appointees stricter regulation

Evidence

A study published in 1988 found that “[i]n cases with significant ideological implications—most major agency rulemakings—democratic D.C. Circuit judges are more likely to reverse agency policies at the behest of individuals, and republican D.C. Circuit judges are more likely to reverse agency policies challenged by business interests.” A second statistical inquiry, published in 1997, reached even starker conclusions. Examining the specific “allegation [that] judges appointed by Republican Presidents vote principally for laxer regulation and judges appointed by Democratic Presidents vote for more stringent regulation,” the author concluded that “ideology significantly influences judicial decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit especially in cases that rais[e] procedural challenges, that are less likely to be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.” — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 1068

Categorization

• XREF: Directly relevant to the D.C. Circuit’s unique role in environmental lawmaking and to the Chevron-deference theme. — connects to: Republican D.C. Circuit judges denied environmental plaintiffs standing four times as often as Democrats — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 1069; Political selection fills the courts with judges holding established partisan views — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2571; Party affiliation reliably predicts how state court judges decide cases — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 432 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• Party affiliation reliably predicts how state court judges decide cases #expands (0.90) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 432
• Political selection fills the courts with judges holding established partisan views #expands (0.78) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2571
• Judges bring consistent long-established political views to the bench #expands (0.78) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2572
• Republicans favor large state responsibilities but small discretionary powers #qualifies (0.75) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 688
• Party influence on judges works through shared values, not direct commands #expands (0.72) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 605