Renouncing the knowing I actually produces the possibility of genuine decision

Evidence

With this in mind, we can understand the assertion in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, namely that philosophy should relinquish ‘any personal intrusions (eigenen Einfallens) into the immanent rhythm of the concept, and not intervene in it either arbitrarily or with wisdom obtained elsewhere’. But to renounce intervening as a ‘knowing I’ does not by any means suggest that all subjectivity is to be renounced. The letting-go of the Self in the act of reading does not suspend all power of decision; on the contrary, it produces the condition of the possibility of decision. The speculative proposition checks our confi- dence in ‘knowing how to read’, thus training the reader in an illiteracy of the second power which will make the reader write what he or she reads. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1235

Categorization

  • XREF: The ‘illiteracy of the second power’ that makes the reader write what she reads resonates with plasticity’s logic of giving form that receives form — and with the reader’s neuroplasticity work where the brain’s structure is reshaped by what passes through it. — connects to: Under loneliness, self-evident logical reasoning becomes a self-generating substitute for real thought — Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 1083; Self-awareness lifts the I above itself while it remains itself — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 814; Belief in good faith is a chosen, self-maintained decision rather than an intuition — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 318
  • DEEPTHINKING: The paradox that relinquishing intervention produces (not merely allows) decision, and that being trained into second-power illiteracy makes one write what one reads — this is the dialectical core of speculative reading, dense enough to sit with.

Broader Connections