Religion is historically contingent, not a fixed essence

Evidence

Religion in the anthropological imagination, Asad argues, must be thought of as contingent and dynamic, as opposed to a Eurocentric conception that defines religion as bounded and universal. To undo this essentialism of universality, religious symbols must be thought of as intimately linked to social life, and thus the concept of religion must change alongside social practice (Asad 1993, 53). To study the concept of religion, it must be framed in terms of a historically specific construction and examined as it changes over time. — Junaid Rana, Terrifying Muslims, 905

Categorization

• DEFINE: Asad’s critique of religion as transhistorical essence: religion is contingent, dynamic, historically specific.
• XREF: Connects to the broader social constructionist tradition (e.g., Berger, Foucault) applied here to religion specifically. — connects to: Hegel’s alienation is a historically specific, modern-Christian concept, not an eternal one — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 916; Religion and nationalism are modern categories co-created by the secular order, not ancient givens. — Nadim N. Rouhana and Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, When Politics Are Sacralized:…, 306
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Junaid Rana, Terrifying Muslims: Race and Labor in…, 905