Rejecting atomism need not entail abandoning the concept of reference

Evidence

There is, of course, little agreement about the epistemological drift of recent work in analytical philosophy of language, as the debates between ‘realists* and ‘anti-realists’ should make clear. Indeed, Richard Rorty has made wicked use of Quine and Davidson to arrive at conclusions highly congenial to textualism. I consider some of the arguments involved in the following chapter. Nevertheless, what the work’alluded to above shows is that the rejection of atomism does not, on the face of it, require the abandonment of the concept of reference: indeed, Davidson’s theory of meaning combines holism and realism. There is more than one way out of the myth of the given. — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, 328

There is, of course, little agreement about the epistemological drift of recent work in analytical philosophy of language, as the debates between ‘realists* and ‘anti-realists’ should make clear. Indeed, Richard Rorty has made wicked use of Quine and Davidson to arrive at conclusions highly congenial to textualism. I consider some of the arguments involved in the following chapter. Nevertheless, what the work’alluded to above shows is that the rejection of atomism does not, on the face of it, require the abandonment of the concept of reference: indeed, Davidson’s theory of meaning combines holism and realism. There is more than one way out of the myth of the given. — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, 328

Categorization

• XREF: Relevant to Jameson’s appropriation of poststructuralism — shows analytic philosophy of language does not necessarily license textualism. Connects to Davidson’s holism vs. Rorty’s textualist use of it. — connects to: The rejection of atomism does not force abandoning reference.; Holism about meaning need not abandon reference or truth. — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist…, 325; It may be that when the details of this practice are laid bare, the concepts we do use will be shown to be as silly and as thick with illusion as those the nominalists invented. If so, then we shall have to find other ways to describe what we do, and either provide other justifications or change our practices. But until we have discovered this and made these adjustments, we cannot accept the nominalists’ premature invitation to turn our backs on the problems our present concepts provide.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist…, 328

Broader Connections

• The rejection of atomism does not force abandoning reference. #corroborates (0.98)
• Holism about meaning need not abandon reference or truth. #expands (0.90) — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, 325
• It may be that when the details of this practice are laid bare, the concepts we do use will be shown to be as silly and as thick with illusion as those the nominalists invented. If so, then we… #qualifies (0.75)