Regulatory process capture by developers predates formal public participation

Evidence

Whatever the origin of railroad regulation, or regulation of public utilities, airlines, and so on, what happens in practice? Whom do the commissions serve? Often, it is claimed, the regulated industry ends up “capturing” the agency and bending it to suit industry purposes. The ICC became the creature of the railroads early in its career; television networks allegedly took over the Federal Communications Commission. The puppets shove aside the puppetmaster and make him dance on their strings. — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law, 583 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

There is, on the whole, some truth to these charges. For one thing, regulators have to live with their subjects. They learn to see things through their subjects’ eyes. Also, com­ missioners are supposed to regulate businesses, not kill them. A state power commission, let us say, has power to fix rates. A gas or electric company applies to the commission for a rate increase. It presents facts and figures about rising costs: coal, oil, and labor are all more expensive. If the commission accepts the facts and figures, it will grant the increase, more often than not. The commission, after all, is responsible for the health of the industry. The gas and electric companies are privately owned and must show a profit. Then, too, some commissioners come from the industry they regulate, and many expect to go back there when their terms are up. They are reluctant, then, to be tough and unyielding. Historically, the public or consumer interest has been weak, diffuse. Who, after all, speaks up for John and Jane Q. Public, day in and day out, at the agency? In many cases, nobody. Yet lobbyists and lawyers for industry have always been there, pressing their cases. — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law, 584 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Industry capture follows from regulators’ incentives and diffuse public interest — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 584; Token advisory processes can serve as pretense for predetermined siting decisions; Regulated industries often capture their own regulators — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 583 (+1 more)

Related

• Industry capture follows from regulators’ incentives and diffuse public interest (similarity 0.86)
• Regulated industries often capture their own regulators (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Regulated industries often capture their own regulators #corroborates (0.88) — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law, 583
• Industry capture follows from regulators’ incentives and diffuse public interest #corroborates (0.82) — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law, 584
• Token advisory processes can serve as pretense for predetermined siting decisions #exemplifies (0.75)
• Procedural inclusion by itself increases acceptance of adverse environmental decisions #complicates (0.75) — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 831