Regulated industries shifted campaign money toward Republicans as environmental law polarized.

Evidence

There is also evidence to suggest that the regulated community now perceives such a partisan divide in environmental law and has, accordingly, adjusted its support of candidates for office. In particular, an analysis of contributions by industry subject to environmental regulation to the political campaigns of Democrats and Republicans reveals shifts over time that are virtually identical to the shifts in the LCV scores of the two parties. Between 1990 and 2002, the amount of money that the energy and natural resource industry contributed to Democrat candidates significantly decreased (from 42 percent to 26 percent) while the amount contributed to Republican candidates correspondingly increased during that same time period (from 58 percent to 74 percent). A more focused inquiry into the campaign contributions of the coal industry is even more striking. Coal industry campaign contributions went from 59 percent Republicans, 41 percent Democrats in 1990, to 88 percent Republicans, 12 percent Democrats in 2002. — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 689

Categorization

• XREF: Hard data grounding the causal claim from ‘candidate positions follow contributor money’ — relevant to Legal Systems’/Eco-Justice discussion of institutional capture. — connects to: Republicans learned to pursue environmental deregulation quietly to avoid public backlash — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 1086

Broader Connections

• Republicans learned to pursue environmental deregulation quietly to avoid public backlash #expands (0.75) — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 1086