Refusing to make law itself becomes a lawmaking act with systemic costs

Evidence

Thus, at one stroke the Court (1) reached an unsound conclusion in the case before it, (2) destroyed the harmony of the underlying maritime law in this general area; and (3) established a precedent which puts in question the continued vitality in the federal courts of the whole Anglo-American tradition of growth of decisional law. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1873

Categorization

• XREF: Connects directly to the polyad law/institutions thread and ch14 on precedent costs of narrow adjudication. — connects to: Courts cannot decline to make law because every merits judgment necessarily resolves the dispute — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1705; A statute’s purpose is qualified by the costs its legislature contemplated — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1432; Direct collective refusal reveals the contingency of official power. — Luke W. Cole and Sheila R. Foster, From the Ground Up: Environmental…, 435 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Direct collective refusal reveals the contingency of official power. #expands (0.85) — Luke W. Cole and Sheila R. Foster, From the Ground Up, 435