Redress succeeds electorally when framed as conservative general-interest, not civil-rights legislation

Evidence

In his opinion, it had to be framed as “something conservative Republicans could buy into as consistent with their values and principles.” Thus, Ujifusa argued, “the thing not to do was to define our bill as a piece of traditional civil rights, ethnic, special-interest legislation. Instead, we defined it as a piece of general-interest legislation consistent with the most conservative, even original-intent reading of the Constitution.” … What it boiled down to was a single commonality: equality of opportunity. Republicans were generally skeptical of government intervention, but like their Democratic counterparts, they still believed in equality of opportunity. According to Ujifusa, “That is precisely what Japanese Americans in camps were denied…. In 1942, what we really wanted was something contemporary conservatives extol—to be left alone by the government.” — Dorothy A. Brown, Getting to Reparations, 222

Categorization

• ADDENDUM: Relevant to the reparations argument’s presentation: how a redress campaign deliberately framed its bill for the audience holding power, a lesson in remedy-demanded framing the reparations case must address.
• SEED: Angle: how issue-framing determines legislative viability — reparations advocates must package for swing conservatives, not assume moral force carries.