Recognition must be taken seriously alongside redistribution in any contemporary justice theory

Evidence

There have been numerous arguments between Fraser and Young (reprinted in Willett 1998) and Fraser and Honneth (2003) regarding the definition and nature of recognition. The argument with Young centers mostly on the relative emphasis on recognition versus redistribution. With Honneth this question is argued as well, but the key difference is between the psychological versus structural nature of recognition. As is usually the case with academic dichotomies, there is validity in both sides. As I discuss below, one must take both recognition and redistribution seriously in any contemporary theory of justice, and Fraser certainly has made that argument. In the argument with Honneth, however, Fraser overstates her case in an attempt to move away from a victim-centered understanding of recognition. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 79

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Clarifies that Fraser’s two-track model treats recognition and redistribution as co-necessary rather than substitutable.
  • recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source
  • XREF: connects to: Justice requires both redistribution and recognition because collectivities are bivalent — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 104; Justice requires addressing recognition and distribution as distinct yet linked injustices. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 65; Justice requires participation parity alongside distribution and recognition. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 66 (+5 more)

Broader Connections