Recognition cannot be distributed like goods because extending it costs nothing

Evidence

Young dismisses the conception of recognition as a good, and yet uses the logic of this rejection to argue for a more thorough engagement with what it means to include the concept in a theory of justice. For Young, recognition is just not a ‘thing’ to be distributed, but a relationship, a social norm embedded in social practice. Young finds discussions regarding equal distribution of ‘opportunities’ or even of ‘rights’ problematic. When we give groups previously denied the right to vote or the right of free speech those rights, they do not come at the ‘expense’ of others—they are not redistributed from one to another, as is income or other goods. Recognition is not limited, materially, in the way goods are. One of the key problems of the theory of distributive justice, argues Young, is that ‘it does not recognize the limits to the application of a logic of distribution’ (1990: 24). — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 95

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Sharply distinguishes recognition-based justice from distributive by showing rights are non-rivalrous where goods are limited.
  • XREF: Directly serves the reader’s cross-course goal: which kind of justice can noise regulation or EJ litigation deliver when recognition is non-distributable? — connects to: Recognition justice extends beyond state remedies into social and cultural realms — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 96; Recognition theory supplements rather than replaces distributional justice — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 100; The pricing of mental and sensory stuff is nonsensical and unsustainable — The Friends of Attention, Attensity!: A Manifesto of the…, 270

Broader Connections