Public-contract corruption is a mutually beneficial transaction, not extortion.

Evidence

What complicates matters further is the corruption that often accompanies the allocation of large public contracts. This occurs when an agent (P)—whether politician, public administrator, or both—contracts out construction work or maintenance and illegally favors one of the competing firms (F) in exchange for a sum of money, known as the cut (la tangente). Almost without exception, corruption in this field does not qualify as extortion but is rather a transaction from which both parties gain. Collusion and corruption influence each other in a variety of ways and are in turn affected by the contract allocation procedures. By increasing the complexity of agreements and hence the scope for cheating, corruption also encourages the intervention of the mafia. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 577

Categorization

• XREF: Sharpens reader’s Gambetta mapping by distinguishing corruption (P-F bilateral gain) from mafia protection (third-party enforcement); shows corruption as a distinct mechanism that later draws the mafia in.
• DEFINE: Defines la tangente (the cut) and explicitly classifies it as a bilateral-gain transaction rather than extortion.