Public choice theory explains election-driven booms and slumps as vote maximization
Evidence
Their point of entry was to assume that agents inside the state behaved no differently from agents elsewhere: they maximized their incomes subject to their constraints. Rather than seeing politicians as neutrally steering the economy according to the vagaries of the business cycle with an eye to the public betterment, public choice theorists discerned a political business cycle, wherein state spending was matched to the electoral calendar to produce booms and slumps that were the cost of elected officials seeking to maximize votes. — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 415
Categorization
- DEFINE: Defines the ‘political business cycle’ concept that grounds the public choice critique of the state.
- XREF: connects to: Public choice theory frames democracy’s vote-seeking as inherently inflationary and chaotic — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 418; Incumbent advantage reflects voter risk aversion in gains while challengers benefit in losses — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2406; Social-choice theory is nearly as neoliberal as public-choice theory — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 1865 (+1 more)
Broader Connections
- Public choice theory treats all policy as self-interested coalitional maneuvering
#expands(0.85) — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 1583 - Incumbent advantage reflects voter risk aversion in gains while challengers benefit in losses
#expands(0.80) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2406 - Social-choice theory is nearly as neoliberal as public-choice theory
#contradicts(0.70) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 1865