Public alarm over national debt levels is conjunctural, not driven by the numbers themselves

Evidence

Before 2008 no one, save for a few fringe conservatives in the United States and elsewhere, were concerned with “excessive” national debts or deficits. Deficit hawks in the United States, for example, pretty much disappeared in embarrassment as, under the banner of fiscal conservativism, the Bush administration pushed both debts and deficits to new heights while inflation remained steady. Even in places where fiscal prudence was the mantra, in the United Kingdom under Gordon Brown, or in Spain and Ireland when they were held up as economic models for their dynamic economies—really—deficits and debt did not garner much attention. Italian public-sector debt in 2002 was 105.7 percent of GDP and no one cared. In 2009, it was almost exactly the same figure and everyone cared. — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 34

Categorization

• XREF: This is the core observation that Mattei’s austerity history and the broader literature build from: debt crises are socially constructed. Connects to Blyth’s own later chapters and to Streeck on the debt state.
• CANDY: Italian debt at 105.7% of GDP uncared-for in 2002, panicked-over in 2009, is a perfect one-line conversation fact.