Protection money is often voluntarily paid for genuine defense

Evidence

A second and equally important point arising from the anecdote of the equine lemon is that, contrary to widespread belief, protection money may be willingly paid. Here, the coachman compensates an actual defensive act performed by the mafioso, so much so that the latter’s forced absence is bitterly regretted. The mafioso is capable of deterring the seller from handing over a lemon. Without that protection the coachman is truly at risk, for he is saddled, as it were, with a bad horse. Thus, although the optimal outcome for the coachman would be to buy a good horse without paying protection money, he still prefers to pay some protection money rather than avoid the transaction altogether or pay for a bad horse. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 48

Categorization

• XREF: Contradicts the coercion-only reading of protection—grounds the reader’s thesis that Puzo’s opening shows the Mafia as an attractive alternative to failed state law, not pure extortion.
• QUESTION: How does voluntary payment reconcile with coercive reputation? Worth exploring whether Gambetta later distinguishes protection-from-theft from protection-from-competition.