Prospective overruling shifts the judge role toward a political overreaching that no theory contains

Evidence

Acceptance of the possibility of overruling prior decisions with no more than prospective effect relieves a court of one of the major practical restraints upon free changes of law. It thus forces attention upon the question of what, if any, considerations other than that of protection of reasonable reliance underly the policy of Rtare decisis. And it heightens the importance of the problem of determining the appropriate limits upon the exercise of judicial discretion in saying what the law should be. Do we have a working theory of the judicial function which would be adequate to prevent judges from assuming political functions and to avoid a disintegrating chaos of doctrine If the propriety of prospective overruling were universally accepted? — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 2850

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects to modern debates over ‘judicial legislation’ and the anti-usurpation rhetoric Zinn voices — links forward to originalism and textualism in the law-course polyad. — connects to: Prospective overruling can stratify private law into dated temporal layers — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 2847; Reliance-based limitations may refine prospective overruling doctrine — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 2848; Retroactive statutes are rarely challenged because prospective operation is the strong tradition. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3021 (+5 more)

Broader Connections